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NATURAL BORN KILLERS:' THE ASSAULT
WEAPONS BAN OF THE CRIME BILL-
LEGITIMATE EXERCISE OF
CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORITY TO
CONTROL VIOLENT CRIME OR
INFRINGEMENT OF A
CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE?
The United States has seen a sharp increase in violent crime
rates.2 Particularly alarming is the rising tide of gun violence in
American society.3 Assault weapons are some of the most danger-
ous 4 and frequently used firearms in the commission of these
crimes.5 In an attempt to curb the proliferation of these powerful
weapons, Congress passed the Violent Crime Control and Law En-
forcement Act of 1994 (the "Anti-Crime Act"),6 banning nineteen
specific brands of assault weapons and copycat models.7 Since the
Second Amendment" grants the basic right to bear arms, a ques-
1 NATURAL BORN KILLERS (Regency 1994) (portraying lives of couple who go on
murdering rampage throughout country and become heroes in process). The title of this
Note is derived from a movie written and directed by Oliver Stone. Id.; see also Natural
Born Killer, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Sept. 2, 1994, at 1 (labeling William Emanuel Tager who
used his semiautomatic AK-47 assault rifle to murder Campbell Montgomery in midtown
Manhattan, "a natural born killer"); cf Ginny Holbert, A Shared Lust For Blood; "Killers"
As Guilty As Media, Cm. SUN TImsS, Sept. 7, 1994, at 49 (stating movie is commentary on
glorification of violence in our culture and features at least 52 on screen killings); Robert D.
McFadden, Police Say Murder Suspect Thinks TV Spied On Him, N.Y. TnuEs, Sept. 2, 1994,
at Bi (outlining gunman Tager's plan to wreak vengeance on television networks for
zapping him with mysterious rays through television).
2 HANDGUN CONTROL INC., H.R.4296, QUESTIONS & ANSWERS 3 (1994) [hereinafter HAND-
GUN CONTROL INC.] (noting significant increase in violent crime rate through years 1986 to
1991).
3 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE UNITED
STATES: 1992 1 (1993) (noting increase of 4,482 in number of murders committed using
firearms within five-year period); Michael R. Rand, Guns And Crime; Crime Data Brief, in
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS 1 (1994) (noting armed offenders
committed record 931,000 violent crimes).
4 Keith Bea, "Assault Weapons": Military-Style Semiautomatic Firearms Facts And Is-
sues, in CONG. RESEARCH SERv., REPORT FOR CONGRESS 5, 19 (1992) (noting rapid succession
capability of assault weapons posing significant societal risks).
5 Id. at 3 (citing results retrieved by Committee on Ways and Means).
6 Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994).
7 Id. § 110101(bXA) (listing nineteen specific brands of assault weapons banned).
8 U.S. CONST. amend. II. "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a
free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed." Id.
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tion arises as to whether such a ban is constitutional. The debate
continues about the legality of this approach to address increasing
gun violence in American society.' Proponents of the ban argue
that the government has a duty to remove these assault weapons
from the streets of the United States. 10 In contrast, opponents of
assault weapon legislation assert that a ban on these firearms will
create serious constitutional problems."
Part One of this Note focuses on the Second Amendment of the
United States Constitution and how it has been interpreted by the
judiciary. Part Two details states' attempts at gun control legisla-
tion. Part Three discusses federal attempts to curb the rise of vio-
lence through gun control measures. Part Four reviews the Anti-
Crime Act as a response to the increasing amount of gun violence
in America. This Note does not address the possible contributing
factors to the growing violent culture, including the reasons be-
hind the proliferation of assault weapons. Rather, the Note pro-
vides an analysis of the constitutional validity of the national as-
sault weapons ban, as enacted in the Anti-Crime Act.
I. THE SECOND AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION
A. Historical Background
A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a
free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall
not be infringed.'"
9 See Tom Diemer, Assault Weapons Ban Raises Questions, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland),
May 16, 1994, at A4 (noting assault weapons ban will raise constitutional questions).
10 Joshua M. Horwitz, Kelley v. R.G. Industries: A Cause ofAction for Assault Weapons,
15 U. DAYTON L. Rev. 125, 132 (1989). Assault weapons are "designed for one purpose
only-to efficiently kill people." Id. (quoting Darrel W. Stephens, Executive Director of Po-
lice Executive Research Forum, Remarks before the United States House of Representa-
tives' Select Committee On Narcotics Abuse And Control: Assault Weapons and Drug En-
forcement (Nov. 1, 1989)).
11 See Keith A. Ehrman & Dennis A. Henigan, The Second Amendment in the Twentieth
Century: Have You Seen Your Militia Lately?, 15 U. DAYTON L. Rev. 5, 6-7 (1989) (para-
phrasing Bush Administration's "Drug Czar," William Bennett, who claimed assault weap-
ons ban would conflict with constitutional provisions); see also Assault Weapons: Hearings
Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., Aug. 3, 1993 [hereinafter
Assault Weapons Hearings] (testimony of Susan Lawson, Director Federal Affairs, Institute
for Legislative Action) (positing that NRA opposes any assault weapons ban as violative of
Second Amendment).
12 U.S. CONST. amend. II.
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Prior to the ratification of the United States Constitution, colo-
nists feared a potentially oppressive central government that
could employ a strong standing army.13 Thus, as a condition of
ratification, the colonists insisted that a right to bear arms be in-
cluded in the Bill of Rights to ensure protection against the fed-
eral government via an independent state militia. 14 The militia
was to be armed by the government and was primarily intended to
13 See TiE FEDERALIST No.46, at 297 (James Madison) (Henry C. Lodge ed. 1888) [here-
inafter TE FEDERALIST No. 46] (stating strength of new nation was that federal govern-
ment would not become too powerful and oppress population due to advantage of being
armed).
14 See Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 11, at 25 (noting that discussions of Constitu-
tional Convention, Bill of Rights, and state ratifying conventions focused on need for states
and citizens to protect themselves from oppressive federal government). "Anti-Federalists
demanded an express declaration of the states' right to arm the militia." Id. at 29 (para-
phrasing 5 J. ELLIoT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS OF THE ADOPTION
OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY TE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILA-
DELPMA IN 1787 217 (1836)); see also THE FEDERALIST No.46, supra note 13, at 371 (stating
James Madison believed citizens of United States need never fear despotic reign similar to
that of British rulers due to their possession of arms); Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing
Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637, 640 (1989) (emphasizing colonists' interest in pro-
tecting local autonomy against federal interferences). Justice McReynolds described the
Second Amendment as "assur[ing] the continuation and render[ing] possible the effective-
ness of [the Militia]." Id. at 654; David C. Williams, Civic Republicanism and the Citizen
Militia: The Terrifying Second Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 551, 555 (1991) (arguing militia
was precondition for right to bear arms); Jay R. Wagner, Comment, Gun Control Legisla-
tion and the Intent of the Second Amendment: To What Extent Is There an Individual Right
to Keep and Bear Arms?, 37 VmL. L. REV. 1407, 1433 (1992) (arguing original intent of
Second Amendment was to provide colonists with personal right to bear arms). "[The Fram-
ers] provided the people with the right to keep and bear arms as a check against abuses of
Congress' power over the military." Id. at 1433. But see Robert Dowlut, The Right to Arms:
Does the Constitution or the Predilection of Judges Reign?, 36 OiLA. L. REv. 65, 67 (1983)
(arguing Framers intended Second Amendment to guarantee individual right to keep and
bear arms for military, public order and self defense purposes); Don B. Kates, Jr., Handgun
Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second Amendment, 82 MICH. L. REv. 204,
217-18 (1983) (asserting right to bear arms is truly individual, even in context of militia).
"[Blelieving that a militia... was necessary for the protection of a free state, [the Framers]
guaranteed the people's right to possess... arms." Id. at 232. "[Tjhe possession of arms was
the vital prerequisite to the right to resist tyranny." Id.
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defend the state from invasion. 15 It has been only in this context
that the right to bear arms has been protected.16
15 See Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 11, at 25 (detailing history underlying formation
of Bill of Rights in light of time period in which colonists lived).
The modern day militia has two aspects to it: the "organized militia" and the "unorgan-
ized militia." See The Militia Act, 32 Stat. 775 (1903). The Militia Act (commonly known as
the "Dick Act") implemented this distinction for the purpose of improving the efficiency of
the National Guard. Id.; see also Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 11, at 37. The "organized
militia", currently vested in the National Guard, is armed by the federal government. Id. at
24. The states, however, still retain certain control over the organized militia. Id. The mili-
tia, armed by the government, could be called on to "quash rebellions, enforce laws, and
defend the state from invasion." Id. (citing 5 J. ELLIOT, Tie DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE
CoNvENTIoNs OF THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE
GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA IN 1787, at 495 (1836)).
10 U.S.C. § 311(a) (1993). "Unorganized militia" consists of able bodied men between
ages of 17 and 45. Id. The federal government arms the unorganized militia only when
necessary. See Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 11, at 37 ("[Tihe National Guard, while
viewed today as a 'federal entity,' is still the state militia during those times when it is not
in federal service... [diespite its federal pay and its federally owned equipment."); id. at 39
(stating it was considered "quite appropriate" for government to arm militia, rather than
having members supply their own guns and ammunition). But see Kates, supra note 14, at
249 n.193. The author hypothesized that since military arms are drawn from centralized
armories, citizens should still have firearms to facilitate militia service. Id. This simply
means that a citizen of the United States no longer has to supply his own weapons when
called into duty since the federal government must supply them when he is called into
service. See 32 U.S.C. § 701 (1988) (noting National Guard shall be equipped with the same
type of uniforms, arms, and equipment as Army); see also Ehrman & Henigan, supra note
11, at 39 (noting no state requires individuals to supply their own weapon for military
service). One of the objectives of the Virginia debates was to forbid the new federal govern-
ment from disarming the state militia. Id. at 22; Kates, supra note 14, at 214. "The 'militia'
was ... not simply allowed to keep their own arms, but affirmatively required to do so." Id.
16 See United States v. Nelsen, 859 F.2d 1318, 1320 (8th Cir. 1988) (holding that since
ban prohibiting switchblades did not impair state militia, it did not violate Second Amend-
ment); Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261, 270 (7th Cir. 1982) (using plain
meaning approach in finding right to bear arms relates to preservation of militia), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983); United States v. Graves, 554 F.2d 65, 66 n.2 (3d Cir. 1977)
(interpreting Second Amendment narrowly to guarantee right to bear arms as member of
militia); United States v. Kozerski, 518 F. Supp. 1082, 1090 (D.N.H. 1981) (denying rural
police officer protection under Second Amendment "militia" argument due to prior felony
conviction), aff'd, 740 F.2d 952 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 842 (1984); see also Ehrman
& Henigan, supra note 11, at 29 (arguing that participants in Virginia debates sought ex-
plicit right to protect themselves from oppressive central government). "The Virginia de-
bates reveal that the delegates were not concerned with an individual right to carry weap-
ons, outside the context of militia service." Id. The only concern at the Virginia debates was
the ability of states to "arm and discipline the militia." Id. at 31. "There is no mention in
the Virginia debates of individuals carrying weapons, or of the need to assure individuals
that the federal government would not confiscate their arms." Id. Any nonmilitia purpose of
arms (i.e. hunting, target shooting, and self-defense) was not discussed during the conven-
tions. Id. at 33; Williams, supra note 14, at 555 (arguing that without militia, right to bear
arms is meaningless); cf TnE FEDERALIST No.46, supra note 13, at 298 (stating any federal
force trying to suppress people would be up against "militia amounting to nearly half a
million of citizens with arms in their hands"); William A. Walker, Book Note, 88 MICH. L
REv. 1409, 1414 (1990) (reviewing WARREN FREEDMAN, THE PRIVILEGE TO KEEP AND BEAR
Aams: THE SECOND AmNDMENT AND ITS INTERmETATION (1989)); Dennis A. Henigan,
Shooting Blanks: The NRA Gets More Firepower From the Second Amendment as a Rhetori-
cal Weapon Than as a Barrier to Gun Control Laws, THE RECORDER, Aug. 3, 1992, at 9
(noting Supreme Court interprets Second Amendment only to extent of guaranteeing state
militia).
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Individuals were not intended to have additional rights within
this collective notion, be they actual members or merely eligible
candidates of the militia.17 During the formation of the Second
Amendment, several other amendments were proposed which spe-
cifically sought to give the right to bear arms to individuals rather
than solely to the militia collectively.' 8 These proposals were sum-
marily rejected.19 Thus, it appears that the Second Amendment
was created to protect state militias,2 0 not to secure an individual
right to bear arms.2 '
17 See United States v. Oakes, 564 F.2d 384, 387 (10th Cir. 1977) (finding state militia
member not protected by Second Amendment for illegal possession of firearm), cert. denied,
453 U.S. 926 (1978); United States v. Warin, 530 F.2d 103, 106 (6th Cir.) (holding enroll-
ment in militia does not confer any right to possess banned weapons), cert. denied, 426 U.S.
948 (1976).
18 Mark Udulutch, The Constitutional Implications of Gun Control and Several Realistic
Gun Control Proposals, 17 AM. J. Cins. LAw 19, 26-27 n.47 (1989) (outlining Samuel Ad-
ams's & New Hampshire's proposals for Second Amendment which guaranteed individuals
right to possess firearms).
19 Id. at 27 (pointing out no proposal advocating individual right to bear arms was
adopted at ratifying convention for United States Constitution); see also Roy G. Weatherup,
Standing Armies and Armed Citizens: An Historical Analysis of the Second Amendment, 2
HASTNGS CONST. L.Q. 961, 1001 (1975) (noting that struggle over Second Amendment cen-
tered on prevention of federal disarmament of state militia).
20 United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939) (holding purpose of Second Amend-
ment is to preserve effectiveness of militia); see also Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 695
F.2d 261, 270 (7th Cir. 1982) (connecting idea of state militia to Second Amendment), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983); Arnold v. City of Cleveland, 616 N.E.2d 163, 168 (Ohio 1993).
"[Tihe amendment was drafted not with the primary purpose of guaranteeing the rights of
individuals to keep and bear arms but, rather, to allow Americans to possess arms to en-
sure the preservation of a militia."Id.; see also ROBERT J. COTrROL, GUN CONTROL AND THE
CONSTrrUTION at xxxv (1993) (stating Supreme Court views Second Amendment as protec-
tion of state militia, not individual right to bear arms); Peter B. Feller & Karl L. Gotting,
The Second Amendment: A Second Look, 61 Nw. U. L. REv. 46, 67-70 (1966) (noting Second
Amendment intends to protect every state via independent state militia).
21 United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1875) (preventing people from organiz-
ing with arms so as to threaten minorities); United States v. Warin, 530 F.2d 103, 106 (6th
Cir.) (holding right to possess submachine gun is not guaranteed by Second Amendment),
cert. denied, 426 U.S. 948 (1976); United States v. Johnson, 497 F.2d 548, 550 (4th Cir.
1974) (reiterating previous courts' holdings denying individual right to bear arms); Stevens
v. United States, 440 F.2d 144, 149 (6th Cir. 1971) (stating possession of firearm by felon
violated federal criminal statute); Thompson v. Dereta, 549 F. Supp. 297, 298-99 (D. Utah
1982) (holding deprivation of exemption from federal firearms laws did not deprive plaintiff
of any constitutional right), appeal dismissed, 709 F.2d 1343 (10th Cir. 1983). There is no
single case which has upheld an individual right to bear arms under the Second Amend-
ment outside of the militia context. Id. at 299; City of Cincinnati v. Langan, 640 N.E.2d
200, 208 (Ohio Ct. App.) (recognizing right to self defense does not include right to bear
illegal arms for such purpose), dismissed, 638 N.E.2d 87 (1994); City of East Cleveland v.
Scales, 460 N.E.2d 1126, 1130 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983) (upholding conviction for possession of
weapon without owner identification card as required by local ordinance); see also Donald
L. Doernberg, 'We the People". John Locke, Collective Constitutional Rights, and Standing
to Challenge Government Action, 73 CAL. L. lEv. 52, 104-05 (1985) (noting view of right to
bear arms as collective rather then individual is reflected by every court to have considered
issue specifically); Robert Dowlut, Federal and State Constitutional Guarantees to Arms, 15
U. DAYTON L. REv. 59, 62-63 (1989) (quoting from PENNsYLvA -A AND THE FEDERAL CONSTI-
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B. Nature of the Right
Although the right to bear arms was enumerated in the Bill of
Rights,22 courts have specifically stated that the Constitution is
not the source of rights themselves, but merely acts as a safeguard
to protect these rights.23 The right to bear arms actually extends
from English common law,24 which itself did not recognize an ab-
solute right to bear arms.25 Therefore, it seems reasonable to infer
that the Framers intended such a condition to apply to the same
right as enumerated in the United States Constitution.26
TUtIoN 1787-1788 at 422 (1888), which rejected Pennsylvania's minority proposal for inclu-
sion as part of the Bill of Rights). The Pennsylvania proposal purported to give persons the
right to bear arms to defend themselves. Dowlut, supra, at 62; Ehrman & Henigan, supra
note 11, at 40 (stating Second Amendment not designed to give every person right possess
arms). "[T]he courts have held, in accordance with Miller, that the interest protected by the
Second Amendment is the collective and public interest in a viable state militia, not the
private interest of individuals in owning firearms for reasons unrelated to the militia." Id.
at 47; Kates, supra note 14, at 206 (noting only a small number of legal scholars endorse
view that individuals possess right to bear arms). The Second Amendment does not guar-
antee the right of any individual against confiscation of arms. Id. at 213; see also LAUENCE
H. TRmE, AMiRcAN CONsTruTiONAL LAw § 5-2 n.6 (2d ed. 1988) (dismissing any notion of
individual right to bear arms); Udulutch, supra note 18, at 48 ("[Tihere exists no individual
right to bear arms."); Williams, supra note 14, at 614 (arguing right to bear arms did not
belong to individuals but rather to militia collectively); cf Cases v. United States, 131 F.2d
916, 922 (1st Cir. 1942) (noting possession of weapon bearing reasonable relationship to
maintenance of militia would be protected by Second Amendment), cert. denied, 319 U.S.
770 (1943).
See also Udulutch, supra note 18, at 27 (noting several amendments favoring individual
right to bear arms were proposed, but none adopted); Weatherup, supra note 19, at 1000-01
(positing that delegates at Constitutional Convention did not intend to secure individual
right to bear arms). But see State v. Dawson, 159 S.E.2d 1, 9 (N.C. 1968). "North Carolina
decisions have interpreted our Constitutions as guaranteeing right to bear arms to the
people in a collective sense.., and also to individuals." Id.
22 U.S. CONST. amend. II (conferring right to bear arms).
23 See United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1886) (stating right to keep and
bear arms is not right granted by United States Constitution); Eckert v. City of Philadel-
phia, 477 F.2d 610, 610 (3d Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 839 (1973); Cases v. United
States, 131 F.2d 916, 921 (1st Cir. 1942) (same), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 770 (1943).
24 See, Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, The Second Amendment: Toward An
Afro-Americanist Reconsideration, 80 GEo. L.J. 309, 320 (1991) (asserting Americans did
not create any new rights in Bill of Rights, but merely recognized rights inherited from
common law of England).
25 See Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 11, at 8 (citing Statute of Northhampton, 1938, 2
Edw. 3, ch. 3 (Eng.)). The English Bill of Rights, which was highly influential in the fram-
ing of the U.S. Constitution's Bill of Rights, established that the right to bear arms could be
regulated by the government. Ehrman & Henigan, supra, at 9; see also Martin C. Ashman,
Handgun Control by Local Government 10 N. Ky. L. Rav. 97, 105 (1982). "There was no
attempt in the English Bill of Rights to create an absolute right to bear arms." Id. But see
Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 11, at 9 n.23 (asserting laws such as Statute of
Northhampton prohibit only public bearing of arms, while right to possess arms is
unaffected).
26 See Cottrol & Diamond, supra note 24, at 322 (quoting English Bill of Rights which
granted restricted right to bear arms as far as allowed by law).
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In general, if a right is deemed absolute, Congress can make no
law limiting that right.27 However, no liberty within the Bill of
Rights has been accorded this protection by the courts. 28 For ex-
ample, the First Amendment guarantees of freedom of speech and
free exercise of religion have been regulated even though they
have been deemed our most fundamental rights.29 Fundamental
rights are given the highest position in the hierarchy of values, yet
even they must sometimes yield to other considerations.3 0 With
regard to gun control, courts have refused to accord such a classifi-
cation to the Second Amendment right to bear arms.3 1 Therefore,
27 BLACes LAw DICTIONARY 9 (6th ed. 1990). "The true and proper law of nature, immu-
table in the abstract or in principle, in theory, but not in application; for very often the
reason, situation and other circumstances, may vary its exercise and obligation." Id.; see
also Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 707-08 (1931) (stating person cannot be deprived of
absolute right).
28 See United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 572 (1975) (noting Fifth Amendment
right against self-incrimination does not apply in grand jury inquiries); see also Head v.
Amoskeag Mfg. Co., 113 U.S. 9, 24-25 (1885) (noting where two absolute rights converge,
invariably, one must yield to other); Providence Bank v. Billings, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 514, 563
(1830) (noting that however absolute right may be, it still must bear some public burdens).
29 See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2805 (1992) (noting freedom of
speech may be abridged after particularly careful scrutiny of state need); see also Lyng v.
Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 453 (1988) (allowing construc-
tion of road through areas used in spiritual activities by Native Americans even though it
would "cause serious and irreparable damage to sacred areas which are an integral and
necessary part of [their] belief system"); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308 (1940)
(recognizing freedom of speech is curtailed when there is immediate threat to public
safety); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1878) (denying Mormon's right to
practice polygamy even though it is significant tenet of Mormon religion).
30 See United States v. Warin, 530 F.2d 103, 107 (6th Cir.) ("even the First Amendment
has never been treated as establishing an absolute prohibition against limitations on the
rights guaranteed therein"), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 948 (1976); see also Konigsberg v. State
Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36, 49 (1961) (rejecting idea that freedom of speech and associa-
tion under First and Fourteenth Amendments are "absolutes"); Arnold v. City of Cleveland,
616 N.E.2d 163, 170-01 (Ohio 1993). "Neither the federal Bill of Rights nor [Ohio's] Bill of
Rights, implicitly or explicitly, guarantees unlimited rights.... There are manifold re-
straints to which every person is necessarily subject for the common good." Id.
Since the Second Amendment has been omitted from any discussion of fundamental
rights, it can be inferred that the right to bear arms is on a lower tier than these rights
which themselves are not absolute. See Warin, 530 F.2d at 107 (quoting from Murdock v.
Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943), which held that First Amendment rights occupy
'preferred position" among those guaranteed by Bill of Rights, a position never accorded to
Second Amendment rights), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 948 (1976).
3' United States v. Nelsen, 859 F.2d 1318, 1320 (8th Cir. 1988) (asserting ban prohibit-
ing switchblades did not impair state militia, and thus was not violative of Tenth Amend-
ment); Stevens v. United States, 440 F.2d 144, 149 (6th Cir. 1971) (upholding federal law
banning possession of firearm by convicted felons); United States v. Tot, 131 F.2d 261, 266
(3d Cir. 1942) (upholding defendant's conviction for receiving firearm transported in inter-
state commerce), rev'd on other grounds, 319 U.S. 463 (1943); In re Atkinson, 291 N.W.2d
396, 398 n.1 (Minn. 1980) (upholding denial of application for permit to carry pistol).
The Second Amendment is unlike other amendments in that it contains its own pream-
ble. See Robert A. O'Hare, Jr. & Jorge Pedreira, Comment, An Uncertain Right: The Second
Amendment and the Assault Weapon Legislation Controversy, 66 ST. JoFN's L. REv. 179,
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the Second Amendment does not protect an absolute right to bear
arms.32 Considering the spirit in which the Second Amendment
was drafted, 3 coupled with consistent judicial interpretation of
the right as neither absolute nor fundamental,34 the right to bear
arms historically has been subject to some degree of regulation.s5
II. STATE APPROACHES TO GUN CONTROL
The approach to achieving effective gun regulation took a dra-
matic turn after a massacre in Stockton, California.36 On January
17, 1989, Patrick E. Purdy, a 24-year old drifter, fired 110 rounds
from his AK-4737 across an elementary school playground, killing
188 (1992). Interestingly, the preamble is used by both sides of the assault weapons contro-
versy. Id.
32 See Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 65 n.8 (1980) ("[Llegislative restrictions on
the use of firearms . . . [do not] trench upon any constitutionally protected liberties.");
Warin, 530 F.2d at 107 (stating Second Amendment poses no barrier to congressional fire-
arms regulation); Kellogg v. City of Gary, 562 N.E.2d 685, 694 (Ind. 1990) (recognizing
Indiana's individual right to bear arms subject to restriction); Arnold, 616 N.E.2d at 166-67
(citing cases indicating individuals do not have fundamental right to bear arms under Sec-
ond Amendment); see also 1 Waii i BLAcKsTONE, CoMVMNTAus ON TmE LAws OF ENG-
LAND 139 (1979) (listing right to bear arms as auxiliary right); Wagner, supra note 14, at
1447 ("The Supreme Court has found only a limited group of fundamental rights."). But see
id. at 1449 (citing JoHN E. NoWAK ET AL., CONSTrrUTIONAL LAw 351 (3d ed. 1986) and indi-
cating Framers considered right to bear arms among most fundamental of all rights).
33 See Laurel Loomis, A New Look At Gun Control Legislation: Responding to a Culture
of Violence, 27 BEVERLY HaLs B. ASS'N J. 160, 160 (1993) (claiming American colonists
lived in constant conflict with various groups of people, including Native Americans, Brit-
ish, and French).
34 See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text (discussing courts' interpretation of
right to bear arms).
35 See United States v. Warin, 530 F.2d 103, 107 (6th Cir.) ("Even where the Second
Amendment is applicable, it does not constitute an absolute barrier to congressional regu-
lation of firearms."), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 948 (1976); Rice v. United States, 850 F. Supp.
306, 309 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (dismissing plaintiff's argument that Second Amendment bars
congressional regulation of firearms); State v. LaChapelle, 451 N.W.2d 689, 690 (Neb.
1990) (stating right to bear arms is not unlimited); Arnold v. City of Cleveland, 616 N.E.2d
163, 172 (Ohio 1993) (stating right to bear arms is subject to reasonable regulation); Wag-
ner, supra note 14, at 1457 ("The Second Amendment, however, does not ban all govern-
mental regulation of firearms."). See generally O'Hare & Pedreira, supra note 31, at 197
(positing any attempt by N.R-A. to challenge assault weapons ban would be futile).
36 See Carl Ingram, State's Fight Over Assault Guns May Set Trend In U.S., L.A. Trn0s,
Feb. 12, 1989, at 3. Attorney General John Van de Kamp, in conjunction with other top law
enforcement officials, was drafting legislation to ban military assault weapons in California
before the slayings occurred in Stockton. Id. The shooting increased support for the legisla-
tion by California State Senator David A. Roberti and then Assemblyman Mike Roos, mak-
ing the fight for gun lobbyists more difficult. Id; Killen, Texas: A Town In Shock; U.S. Mass
Murders, ATLANTA J. AND CONST., Oct. 17, 1991, at A10 (discussing Purdy's killing spree in
California).
37 Schoolyard Gunman Laid To Rest, PRoPRIETARY TO THE UNIMD PRESS INTERNATIONAL
(Calif.), Jan. 20, 1989, at 1. Purdy entered the Cleveland Elementary School playground
wearing combat gear and toting a Chinese-made AK-47, a semiautomatic military rifle. Id
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five children and wounding thirty other individuals.38 There was a
tremendous public outcry for immediate action.3 9 Within months,
the California legislature passed the Roberti-Roos Assault Weap-
ons Control Act of 198940 which effectively banned the future sale,
production, or possession of certain assault weapons within the
state.4 ' The legislation restricts assault weapons based on their
"high rate of fire and capacity for firepower .... ,42 Notwithstand-
ing strong opposition from gun lobbyists,43 it was found that an
assault weapon's "function[s] as a legitimate sports or recreational
firearm [are] substantially outweighed by the danger that such
weapons can be used to kill and injure human beings."44 The
statewide assault weapons ban was strongly supported by law en-
forcement groups as well as a majority of the California popula-
tion.45 The legislation has also been upheld by the federal judicial
system. 46
38 Patrick Purdy's Gun, WASH. POST, Jan. 19, 1989, at A26 (stating Purdy purchased his
AK-47 in Oregon to avoid disclosure of his California criminal record).
39 California Legislature Passes Law To Ban Assault Guns, REUTERs, May 18, 1989
[hereinafter California Legislature Passes Law to Ban Assault Guns] (noting Stockton trag-
edy caused public outcry for speedy action); Douglas Jehl, Debut of Colt's 'Sporter' Revives
Assault-Rifle Debate; Firearms: The Maker Says The AR-15 Has Been Stripped of its
Paramilitary Features. Gun Control Advocates Call it A Combat Weapon In Disguise, LA.
TtMEs, Apr. 19, 1990, at A18 (noting White House response in addition to public outrage
after Stockton massacre); Susan F. Rasky, Import Ban on Assault Rifles Becomes Perma-
nent, N.Y. TvMES, July 7, 1989, at A6 (stating public outcry changed President Bush's mind
about banning importation of assault weapons).
40 CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 12275-12290 (West 1992) (banning sale, production, and posses-
sion of military style assault weapons in California).
41 See Assault Gun Ban Is Sent to Governor; Compromise Measure Would Make Califor-
nia 1st to Forbid Such Arms, L.A. TIMES, May 18, 1989, at Al (discussing final compromise
in California Roberti-Roos Bill).
42 Roberti-Roos Assault Weapons Control Act of 1989, CAL. PENAL CODE § 12275.5 (West
1990).
43 Daniel Abrams, Ending the Other Arms Race: An Argument for a Ban on Assault
Weapons, 10 YALE L. & PoL'Y REV. 488, 514 (1992) (noting despite strong opposition from
NRA, assault weapons control legislation has been enacted in several states including Cali-
fornia); see Cynthia H. Craft, "Copycat" Gun Ban Survives Critical Vote; Firearms: Assem-
bly Panel Agrees to Toughen Current Assault Weapons Law by Prohibiting Near-Replicas
from Being Made or Sold, L.A. TMEs, Aug. 26, 1994, at A3 (noting NRA lobbyists and gun
group representatives' efforts to defeat bill broadening assault weapons ban in California).
44 Roberti-Roos Assault Weapons Control Act of 1989, CAL. PENAL CODE § 12275.5 (West
1990) (employing balancing test as to whether assault weapon function as legitimate sports
firearm is substantially outweighed by danger it may be used for murder).
45 William D. Murray, Federal Appeals Court Upholds Ban on Assault Weapons, Paopm-
ETARY To THE UNrrED PRESS INTERNATIONAL (Calif.), May 22, 1992 (noting group support for
state ban on assault weapons).
46 See Fresno Rifle & Pistol Club, Inc. v. Van de Kamp, 746 F. Supp. 1415, 1419 (E.D.
Cal. 1990) (concluding "Constitution had left the question of gun control to the several
states" and no federal constitutional provisions had been offended), aff'd, 965 F.2d 723 (9th
Cir. 1992); see also Murray, supra note 45 (noting California's appellate court upheld "hotly
debated ban on assault weapons" despite constitutional arguments by NRA).
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A. Application of the Bill of Rights to the States
As discussed, the right to bear arms, as well as the other rights
found in the Bill of Rights, resulted from a mistrust of a strong,
potentially oppressive central government.4 7 Accordingly, the Bill
of Rights only placed limitations on the power of Congress.4" State
powers were not affected.49 However, in order to protect individual
civil rights against encroachment by state government, courts be-
gan to apply the Bill of Rights as a bar to state action via incorpo-
ration using the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.50 For example, a state cannot set up a state religion in
violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment due
to the Clause's incorporation against the states.51 The Supreme
Court has never explicitly incorporated the Second Amendment to
apply against the states.5 2 A minority of the Court once theorized
that the Fourteenth Amendment served to incorporate the entire
47 See 2 Wijmim BLACKSTONE, CohniErrAmxs 412 (1766) ( P]revention of popular in-
surrections and resistance to the government, by disarming the bulk of the people... is a
reason oftener meant than avowed...."); see also Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 11, at 33
("The amendment was to protect the states' ability to maintain effective militia, and to
protect against an oppressive federal government."); Maynard H. Jackson, Jr., Handgun
Control: Constitutional and Critically Needed, 8 N.C. CENT. L.J. 189, 190 n.5 (1977)
("[Flear of England's standing army was a major grievance of the Colonists, and distrust of
the independence of the military characterized the Colonists's [sic] other grievances."); Loo-
mis, supra note 33, at 161 (stating one philosophy upon which America was founded was of
armed citizenry to fight off oppressive dictatorship).
48 See Note, Rethinking the Incorporation of the Establishment Clause: A Federalist
View, 105 Hv. L. REv. 1700, 1700 (1992) [hereinafter Incorporation of the Establishment
Clause] (noting Bill of Rights originally applied only against federal government).
49 See Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 257 (1886) (upholding indictment of Herman
Presser for conducting military exercises in streets of Chicago); see also Miller v. Texas, 153
U.S. 535, 538 (1894) (rejecting Second and Fourth Amendment challenges because, as part
of Bill of Rights, they were not applicable against states).
50 See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947) (interpreting First Amendment
Establishment Clause as applying to state legislatures as well as federal government).
51 See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430 (1962) (noting Establishment Clause acts as bar
to state action by virtue of Fourteenth Amendment); Everson, 330 U.S. at 8 (declaring First
Amendment to be applicable against states by Fourteenth Amendment).
52 See Vietnamese Fisherman's Ass'n v. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, 543 F. Supp. 198,
216 (S.D. Tex. 1982) (preventing Ku Klux Klan from conducting private military training
camps); see also GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTrrUTIONAL LAw 784 (2d ed 1991) (listing
Second Amendment as one of rights not incorporated); LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMEmcAN CON-
sTrruTIONAL LAw § 11-2, at 772 (1st ed. 1978) (positing that majority of Supreme Court has
never accepted full incorporation of Bill of Rights into Fourteenth Amendment); Book Note,
A Radical Intent, 101 HARv. L. REv. 869, 872 n.l1 (1988) (noting Second Amendment right
to bear arms is one never incorporated by Supreme Court); cf Kates, supra note 14, at 253
(posing since Supreme Court has only engaged in incorporation after Miller decision, due
process incorporation of Second Amendment should be strongly considered).
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Bill of Rights. 8 However, this view of "total incorporation" has
never been given legal force by the Court." Consequently, state
restrictions on the possession of various arms, even assault weap-
ons,55 cannot offend the Second Amendment and have been up-
held by courts of several states.56
The Constitution has always been considered a "legal floor" be-
neath which the laws of the states may not fall. 57 Thus, when the
federal government sets up a minimum standard, under the
53 See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68-123 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting) (arguing
Fourteenth Amendment should be applied to enforce first eight amendments of Bill of
Rights against states).
54 See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 62 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (stat-
ing that out of 43 judges to consider it, only one eccentric exception ever indicated belief
that Fourteenth Amendment applied first eight amendments against states); Palko v. Con-
necticut, 302 U.S. 319, 323 (1937) (rejecting broad application of Fourteenth Amendment
against entire Bill of Rights); TINE, supra note 52, at 772 (noting that full incorporation of
Bill of Rights through Due Process Clause has never been accepted by majority of Supreme
Court); Melvin I. Urofsky, Conflict Among The Brethren: Felix Frankfurter, William 0.
Douglas and the Clash of Personalities and Philosophies on the United States Supreme
Court, 1988 DuKe L.J. 71, 104 (noting that Supreme Court has never applied Black-Doug-
las view of total incorporation); see also O'Hare & Pedreira, supra note 31, at 192 (discuss-
ing Supreme Court's rejection of total incorporation); Incorporation of the Establishment
Clause, supra note 48, at 1701 (stating full incorporation has never commanded majority
Court opinion).
55 See Fresno Rifle & Pistol Club, Inc. v. Van de Kamp, 746 F. Supp. 1415, 1419 (E.D.
Cal. 1990) (holding assault weapons ban does not offend any federal constitutional provi-
sions), aff'd, 965 F.2d 723 (9th Cir. 1992).
56 Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261, 269 (7th Cir. 1982) (upholding village
ordinance prohibiting handgun possession), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983); Fresno Rifle,
746 F. Supp. at 1419 (upholding California statute regulating manufacture and transfer of
assault weapons); Crowley Cutlery v. United States, No. 87 C 8013, 1987 WL 16908, at *1
n.1 (N.D. Ill. September 9, 1987) (permitting ban on importation of switchblades since reg-
ulation is not violative of right to bear arms), aff'd, 849 F.2d 273 (7th Cir. 1988); People v.
Garcia, 595 P.2d 228, 230 (Colo. 1979) (upholding prohibition of intoxicated people from
possessing firearms); People v. Blue, 544 P.2d 385, 390 (Colo. 1975) (stating right to bear
arms is not absolute and can be restricted by state); Sandidge v. United States, 520 A.2d
1057, 1059 (D.C.) (upholding District of Columbia firearm statute, prohibiting possession of
unregistered firearms), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 868 (1987); Arnold v. City of Cleveland, 616
N.E.2d 163, 173 (Ohio 1993) (upholding ordinance prohibiting possession and sale of as-
sault weapons); Beaver v. Dayton, No. 13871, 1993 WL 333641, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug.
30, 1993) (upholding Dayton's ban of assault weapons); Hale v. City of Columbus, 578
N.E.2d 881, 886 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990) (upholding assault weapons ban as valid exercise of
state's police power), cause dismissed, 569 N.E.2d 513 (Ohio 1991); cf Springfield Armory
v. City of Columbus, 29 F.3d 250, 254 (6th Cir. 1994) (invalidating Ohio ordinance banning
possession of assault weapons due to vagueness, not Second Amendment); Dowlut, supra
note 21, at 79 (citing twenty cases where state arms laws have been found
unconstitutional).
57 Arnold, 616 N.E.2d at 169 (discussing standard provided by United States Constitu-
tion as applicable to states); see also Loomis, supra note 33, at 168 (stating that any state's
waiting period may exceed five days and take precedence over federal waiting period pro-
vided that it does not fall below five day minimum); H.R. REP. No. 7, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 2 (1991) (discussing House of Representatives view of states already imposing specified
waiting period for purchase of handguns, being able to keep such provisions provided that
waiting periods are longer than five days).
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Supremacy Clause, all states are required to do at least as much
as is federally mandated .5  However, since the Second Amend-
ment has not been incorporated to restrict the states, if a state
chooses to be more restrictive than the federal government, then
that is the state's prerogative.5 9 If Congress were to "raise the
floor," the states would have to align their regulations with Con-
gress's directive.6 0 For instance, when the federal government
raised the minimum wage requirement, all states had to at least
meet this minimum standard.61 Analogizing this to gun control,
Congress "raised the floor" in 1986, when machine guns were pro-
hibited from being manufactured or sold to civilians.62 As a result,
all states are prohibited from allowing the manufacture, transfer,
or possession of these guns.63 States are within their realm, how-
ever, to impose additional restrictions as deemed appropriate by
their respective legislatures.6 4
58 See FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 767 (1982) (discussing how cooperative feder-
alism allows states to enact and administer their own way within limits established by
federal minimum standards); see also Paul W. Kahn, Interpretation and Authority in State
Constitutionalism, 106 HARv. L. REv. 1147, 1148 (1993) (discussing concept of legal floor
where state courts may not violate United States Supreme Court interpretations of federal
law); H. Todd Iveson, Manufacturer's Liability to Victim's of Handgun Crime: A Common-
Law Approach, 51 FoRDHAM L. REv. 771, 775 (1983) (noting Gun Control Act's authority
allows for some state action but only that not reserved to Act).
59 See Dowlut, supra note 21, at 75 (stating that, unlike Congress, state legislatures do
not depend upon Constitution for express grant of legislative power).
60 See Moreau v. Klevenhagen, 113 S. Ct. 1905, 1907-08 (1993) (asserting Congress's
power to impose minimum wage and maximum hour requirements under Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act); see also Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 554 (1985)
(dismissing federal minimum wage requirements as not destructive of state sovereignty);
Robert F. Copple, Cable Television and the Allocation of Regulatory Power: A Study of Gov-
ernmental Demarcation and Roles, 44 FED. Comm. L.J. 1, 30 (1991) (outlining FCC's ability
to establish minimum standards for local components of cable regulation); Mary A. Stilts,
The Ever Changing Balance of Power in Interstate Water Pollution: Do Affected States Have
Anything to Say After Arkansas v. Oklahoma?, 50 WASH. & Laa L. REV. 1341, 1341 n.4(1993) (noting federal Clean Water Act only leaves states autonomy to be more stringent
and not less).
61 Garcia, 469 U.S. at 554 (noting lack of state governmental immunity from minimum
wage and overtime obligations imposed by Fair Labor Standards Act).
62 Ban Sets Staccato Pace for Machine Gun Sales, CHi. Tam., May 29, 1986, at C3 (re-
porting President Reagan's support for national machine gun ban); Wayne King, Plinking
Away at Federal Gun Control, N.Y. Tnmms, Nov. 16, 1986, at D4 (announcing legislation
forbidding future machine gun manufacture for public sale); see also HANDGUN CoNTROL
INc., supra note 2 (outlining current automatic weapons ban). In 1934, Congress also re-
quired the registration of all fully-automatic weapons. Id.; Wayne King & Warren Weaver
Jr., Washington Talk: Briefing; Gun-Control Struggle, N.Y. Tmnvs, Dec. 7, 1986, at 90 (not-
ing ban on further manufacture of machine guns which was passed by Congress).
63 Wayne King & Warren Weaver, Jr., Washington Talk: Briefing; Split in the Gun
Lobby, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 12, 1986, at 58 (noting Gun Control Act amendment restricting all
machine gun sales and manufacture throughout United States).
64 See Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261, 271 (7th Cir. 1982) (upholding
local ordinance placing further restrictions with respect to firearms possession), cert. de-
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B. Judicial Interpretations of State Legislation
In an effort to promote and protect the welfare and safety of
their citizenry, 5 many states, cities, and counties have followed
California's lead. 6 Courts on both the state and federal level have
strictly interpreted the Second Amendment to be a protection of
the state militia against federal encroachment.6 7 This strict inter-
pretation has allowed some states to enact legislation banning the
possession of assault weapons, even though some state constitu-
tions confer a greater right unto their citizens than does the Fed-
eral Constitution.68 In addition, courts have consistently upheld
various prohibitive statutes and ordinances as proper and neces-
sary exercises of police power,6 9 despite the fact that some state
nied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983); Robertson v. City of Denver, 874 P.2d 325, 333 (Colo. 1994)
(upholding assault weapon ban as within state police powers); Arnold v. City of Cleveland,
616 N.E.2d 163, 169 (Ohio 1993) (allowing local ban of assault weapons).
65 James Stewart & Andrew Alexander, Assault Weapons Muscling in on the Front Lines
of Crime, ATLANTA J. & CONST., May 21, 1989, at Al (reporting although assault weapons
accounted for approximately one percent of 200 million privately owned firearms in United
States, assault weapons were 20 times more likely to be used in crime than conventional
firearms); cf David Freed, Assault Rifles Are Not Heavily Used In Crimes, L.A. TIms, May
20, 1992, at A18 (indicating assault weapons were not prevalent among drug dealers and
were involved in less than two percent of fatal shootings investigated by Los Angeles Police
Department during 1990 and 1991).
66 See Abrams, supra note 43, at 514 (noting since California banned assault weapons,
increasing numbers of jurisdictions have enacted some type of assault weapon control legis-
lation); O'Hare & Pedreira, supra note 31, at 196-97 (noting 27 cities and counties which
enacted assault weapons legislation in 1989 after Stockton massacre); see also Quilici v.
Village of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1982) (upholding local ordinance prohibit-
ing possession of handguns), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983); cf Levinson, supra note 14,
at 655 (commenting that determination by Congress denying possession of assault weapons
to private citizens would be supported by judiciary); see generally Wagner, supra note 14, at
1457 (suggesting banning possession of assault weapons may be justified by government's
compelling interest).
67 Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 265 (1886) ("[Second Amendment] has no other effect
than to restrict the powers of the National government."); United States v. Tot, 131 F.2d
261, 266 (3rd Cir. 1942) (upholding federal regulation against interstate shipment of fire-
arms to persons convicted of crimes of violence), rev'd on other grounds, 319 U.S. 463
(1943); Burton v. Sills, 248 A.2d 521, 530, 531 (N.J. 1968) (upholding New Jersey's gun
control law, licensing of manufacturers and wholesalers, as well as issuance of permit and
identification cards), appeal dismissed, 394 U.S. 812 (1969); see also Kates, supra note 14,
at 211-12 (posing that Second Amendment is viewed by some as responding to U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cl. 15, 16 which gives Congress power to call out militia and arm it); Udulutch,
supra note 18, at 32 (asserting federal government is prohibited only by Second Amend-
ment from eliminating state militia's power to arm itself). But see Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243,
251 (1846) (holding all people have right to bear arms for traditionally lawful purposes).
68 Arnold v. City of Cleveland, 616 N.E.2d 163, 169 (Ohio 1993) (holding Ohio Constitu-
tion conferred upon individuals right to bear arms but did not prohibit ban of assault weap-
ons); see also Henigan, supra note 16, at 9 (noting lack of incorporation of Second Amend-
ment renders argument against ban nullity).
69 See Robertson v. City of Denver, 874 P.2d 325, 333 (Colo. 1994) (upholding ordinance
banning possession, sale, or manufacture of assault weapons as reasonable exercise of
state's police power); People v. Atencio, 878 P.2d 147, 150 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994) (concluding
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and federal constitutions provide for individual70 as well as collec-
tive rights to bear arms.71
For instance, in Robertson v. City of Denver,72 the Supreme
Court of Colorado upheld a city ordinance banning assault weap-
ons despite the state's constitutional right to bear arms.7 Simi-
larly, in Arnold v. City of Cleveland,74 an ordinance enacted by the
Cleveland City Council, banning the possession and sale of as-
sault weapons, was validated as a proper exercise of police power
by the Ohio Supreme Court, even in the face of Ohio's constitu-
tional grant of an individual right to bear arms.75
State and city initiatives to control assault weapons have the
potential to serve the specific needs of these communities since the
legislatures have the power and resources necessary to develop
customized solutions.76 Nevertheless, many states do not impose
statutory controls on the manufacture or sale of assault
weapons.77
As a case in point, New York City has very strict gun control
laws which prohibit the "possession or disposition of assault weap-
ons."78 However, legislative attempts to enact similar restrictions
Colorado statute limiting right to bear arms for self-defense purpose as protected by Colo-
rado Constitution is valid exercise of state's police power); Arnold, 616 N.E.2d at 173 (vali-
dating ordinance prohibiting possession and sale of assault weapons within Cleveland).
70 See Arnold, 616 N.E.2d at 171 (interpreting Ohio constitutional right to bear arms as
fundamental, individual right, not absolute right).
71 See U.S. CONST. amend. II; United States v. Warin, 530 F.2d 103, 106 (6th Cir.) (inter-
preting Second Amendment guarantee as collective rather than individual right), cert. de-
nied, 426 U.S. 948 (1976).
72 Robertson, 874 P.2d at 351.
73 Id. at 331-33 (reasoning states may properly exercise their police power by enacting
laws to protect public health, safety, and welfare).
74 616 N.E.2d 163 (Ohio 1993).
75 Id. at 170-71 (reasoning right to bear arms, as provided by Ohio Constitution, is fun-
damental but not absolute right); see Beaver v. City of Dayton, No. 13871, 1993 WL 333641
(Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 30, 1993) (finding Dayton ordinance, identical to Cleveland ordinance
in Arnold, permissible).
76 California Legislature Passes Law to Ban Assault Guns, supra note 39 (noting state
Assembly's plan to outlaw military-style guns in face of local incidence like one in
Stockton).
77 Udulutch, supra note 18, at 43 (noting lack of uniformity in state firearms control
laws); see also Shawn G. Kennedy, Crime Bill Bans the Clip Used in Rifle, N.Y. TnoMs, Sept.
2, 1994, at B2. William Emanuel Tager was arrested for the murder of Campbell Montgom-
ery. Id. There was some indication that the semiautomatic rifle used in the murder was
purchased in North Carolina, where rifles may be easily purchased without a waiting pe-
riod. Id.
78 NEW YoRK, N.Y., AnssN. CODE ch. 3, § 10.303.1(a) (1991). "It shall be unlawful for any
person to possess or dispose of any assault weapon within the city of New York... ." Id.; see
also OFFICE OF JUSTICE Sys. ANALYSIS, DIV. OF CRIM. JUSTICE SERVICES, ASSAULT WEAPONS
AND HoMCmE IN NEw Yomc (1994) [hereinafter ASSAULT WEAPONS AND HOMICIDE IN NEW
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statewide in New York have been unsuccessful up to this point,79
thus weakening attempts to control and reduce the incidence of
violent crimes involving guns and assault weapons within New
York City's limits.8 0
III. FEDERAL APPROACH TO GUN CONTROL
Since assault weapon regulations vary,"' the proliferation of
weapons obtained from inadequately regulated or completely un-
regulated areas undermines attempts to control the destructive
power of assault weapons within other communities.8 2 The incon-
gruity and ineffectiveness of gun restrictions among states sup-
port Congress's enactment of the Anti-Crime Act as a means of
controlling assault weapons from a national perspective.8 3
The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 is
Congress's first ban of assault weapons, but it is not the first time
that gun control legislation has made its way through Congress. 4
The federal government's role in gun control has become increas-
YORK] (examining use of assault weapons in homicides committed in New York City during
1993).
79 See ASSAULT WEAPONS AND HOMCImE IN NEW YORK, supra note 78 (1994) (underscor-
ing need for New York regulation of assault weapons in order to decrease their use in vio-
lent crimes). Legislation proposed by former Governor Mario Cuomo has been passed by
the New York State Assembly but not the state Senate as of yet. Id.
80 Assault Weapons as a Public Health Hazard in the United States; American Medical
Association Council on Scientific Affairs Report, 267 JAMA 3067, 3069 (1992) [hereinafter
Assault Weapons as a Public Health Hazard] (noting lack of state consensus as to control of
assault weapons).
81 See id. (discussing state and local enactments regulating assault weapons).
82 See THs HONORABLE RUDOLPH W. GULrNmI, MAYOR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK & Wa-
LIAM J. BRATToN, POLICE COMMISSIONER, POLICE STRATEGY No. 1: GETrING GUNs OFF THE
STREETS OF NEW YORK, at 6 (Mar. 7, 1994) (confirming that over 90% of firearms seized in
New York City were originally purchased in other states); Markus Boser, Go Ahead, State,
Make Them Pay: An Analysis of Washington D.C.'s Assault Weapon Manufacturing Strict
Liability Act, 25 CoLum. J.L. & Soc. lNos. 313, 322 (1992) (concluding absent federal
legislation, solutions at state and local levels are likely to be ineffective).
83 See Abrams, supra note 43, at 516, 519 (1992) (supporting national ban on assault
weapons, with caution, as possible solution to reduce the proliferation of assault weapons
in United States); Udulutch, supra note 18, at 23, 43, 50-54 (asserting need for increased
controls on semiautomatic weapons and proposing federal ban as viable solution); Richard
H. Kuh, The Firearm Explosion: The Bar Has Not Been Silent, 211 N.Y. L.J., Jan. 2, 1994,
at 13 (noting American Bar Association's active support of gun control since 1965 and need
for further legislation limiting availability of assault weapons); see also 140 CONG. REc.
H3064, 3067, 3072 (1994) (disclosing that during House debate, several representatives
urged legislature to follow California's lead and pass national assault weapons ban); 140
CONG. REc. 115, S11,852 (1994) (statement of Sen. Biden citing support for Anti-Crime Act
from twelve law enforcement organizations throughout country).
84 See Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 1202 (1988)
(prohibiting convicted felon from receiving, possessing, or transporting firearms); National
Firearms Act of 1934,26 U.S.C. § 1132 (1988) (barring any transportation of firearms with-
out regulation); Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107 Stat.
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ingly restrictive as the sophistication of weapons increases81 and
the effectiveness with which law enforcement officials are able to
combat this problem decreases.86
A. The National Firearms Act of 1934
The National Firearms Act of 193487 (the "Act") was Congress's
first venture into gun control.88 It was also the source of the con-
troversy that gave the Supreme Court an opportunity to interpret
the rights conferred by the Second Amendment.8 9 In United States
v. Miller,90 Jack Miller transported a sawed-off shotgun across in-
terstate lines without registering it pursuant to the Act.91 The
United States District Court for the Western District of Arkansas
held that Miller's conviction under the Act could not be sustained,
since the Act violated the Second Amendment. 92 The Supreme
Court reversed the lower court's decision and stated that the Na-
tional Firearms Act did not violate the Constitution.93 Thus, the
1536 (1993) (outlining statutory waiting period permitting chief law enforcement officer to
conduct background check).
85 See Robertson v. City of Denver, 874 P.2d 325,332 n.16 (Colo. 1994) (quoting J. LEwis,
THE GUN DIGEST BOOK OF ASSAULT WEAPONS 48 (2d ed. 1989), which states that assault
weapons can deliver large number of shots without needing to stop and slam-in fresh maga-
zine); see also Addison v. Williams, 546 So. 2d 220,227 (La. Ct. App.) (discussing Colt M-16
assault rifle's design which includes ability of bullet to tumble on impact to "increase the
killing and maiming capabilities"), cert. denied, 550 So. 2d 634 (La. 1989).
86 See George J. Church, The Other Arms Race; America's Streets Become Free-Fire Zones
as Police, Criminals and Terrified Citizens Wield More and Ever Deadlier Guns, Timm, Feb.
6, 1989, at 20; see also Ann Devroy, Clinton Renews His Call For Gun Control Laws, WASH.
POST, Sept. 25, 1993, at A4 (discussing President Clinton's awareness of level of weaponry
possessed and adverse impact such weapons have on law enforcement officials' effective-
ness); Pierre Thomas & Guy Gugliotta, L.A. Scenes Led to Pleas for Peace--and Call to
Arms; California Firearms Sales Surge, WASH. PoST, May 18, 1992, at A4 (depicting law-
less scene during L.A. riots where merchants brandished shotguns to ward off looters while
fire fighters were shot at while trying to quell flames).
87 26 U.S.C. § 5861 (1988) (barring any transportation of firearms without registration).
8 See Loomis, supra note 33, at 162 (noting first ban on handguns was enacted in 1837,
but dismissing it as insignificant when compared with later federal government legislation,
such as the Gun Control Act of 1968).
89 See Kates, supra note 14, at 250 ("Miller is the Supreme Court's first and last ex-
tended treatment of the second amendment."); see also Cottrol & Diamond, supra note 24,
at 310 (noting debate over Second Amendment is "constitutional debate that has taken
place largely in the absence of a Supreme Court decision"); Ehrman & Henigan, supra note
11, at 41 ("[Miller] is the Court's only extensive treatment of the meaning of the second
amendment.").
90 307 U.S. 174 (1939) (holding National Firearms Act of 1934, which banned importa-
tion of firearm without registering it, to be constitutional).
91 Id. at 175.
92 United States v. Miller, 26 F. Supp. 1002, 1003 (W.D. Ark.) (finding National Fire-
arms Act valid), rev'd, 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
93 Miller, 307 U.S. at 183.
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Court held that a provision which placed restrictions on the right
to keep and bear arms was constitutional. 94
B. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968
The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act (the "Gun
Control Act")95 prohibits convicted felons from "receiv[ing], pos-
sess[ing] or transport[ing] a firearm."96 The Supreme Court, in
Lewis v. United States, upheld the validity of the Gun Control
Act.9 7 Although the Court did not deem this a Second Amendment
question, the regulation of the right to bear arms was never chal-
lenged. 98 The only reason the case was before the Court was be-
cause Lewis's prior felony conviction was obtained without the
presence of counsel. 99 Notwithstanding the Second Amendment,
the Court allowed a denial of any right to bear arms to an entire
class of people. 10 0 It may be inferred from this decision that addi-
tional gun regulation, such as a prohibition of assault weapons,
may be accomplished through federal legislation. 1 1
Although the Supreme Court has not spoken explicitly on the
Gun Control Act in terms of the Second Amendment, United
States Courts of Appeals have upheld the validity of the Gun Con-
trol Act in the face of Second Amendment challenges. 10 2 Unless
the Supreme Court has held otherwise, the circuit courts' view
94 Id. at 178; see also Cases v. United States, 131 F.2d 916, 921 (1st Cir. 1942) (stating
National Firearms Act not violative of Second Amendment), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 770
(1943).
95 Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 1213 (prohibiting convicted felon from receiving, possess-
ing, or transporting firearms) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (1988 & Supp. V
1993).
96 Id.
97 445 U.S. 55, 66 (1980).
98 Id. at 65 n.8. The Court stated: "[L]egislative restrictions on the use of firearms are
neither based upon the constitutionally suspect criteria, nor do they trench upon any con-
stitutionally protected liberties." Id.
99 Id. at 55 (noting state felony conviction without presence of counsel is
unconstitutional).
100 Id. at 66 (recognizing power of legislature to prohibit activities of felons far more
fundamental than right to bear arms).
101 See O'Hare & Pedreira, supra note 31, at 197 (positing futility of challenges to as-
sault weapons ban). The authors also noted that for any gun regulation to be effective, it
must be done at the federal level. Id. at 204; see also Udulutch, supra note 18, at 50 (advo-
cating federal assault weapon ban without fear of constitutional offense).
102 See Mitchell Arms v. United States, 7 F.3d 212, 212 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (upholding revo-
cation of importer's permits as valid under Gun Control Act), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2100
(1994); United States v. Walker, 489 F.2d 1353, 1358 (7th Cir. 1973) (reversing district
court which dismissed indictment under Act), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 982 (1974); Brennan v.
United States, 435 F. Supp. 451, 454 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (denying any argument that Act is
violative of Second Amendment).
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that restrictive legislation does not offend the constitutional no-
tion of the right to bear arms will continue. 10 3
C. Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act
The Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act (the "Brady
Act") 10 4 is the most recent federal gun legislation prior to the pas-
sage of the Anti-Crime Act. 10 5 The Brady Act imposes a five day
waiting period before the purchaser of a handgun is allowed to
take possession. 10 6 The Brady Act has two major purposes: the
first is to prevent those who have shown a demonstrated propen-
sity toward committing crimes from obtaining a firearm; the sec-
ond is to deter those who may be considering committing a crime,
by mandating a time period in which they can reconsider.10 7 The
validity of the Brady Act has yet to be determined by the Supreme
Court.10 8 Lower courts, however, have declined to strike the Brady
Act down based on any Second Amendment grounds. 10 9
Even the strongest opponent of gun control would be likely to
acknowledge that the government has a compelling and legitimate
interest in protecting the citizenry from gun-related violence. 110
103 See United States v. Decker, 446 F.2d 164, 166 (8th Cir. 1971) (upholding validity of
Gun Control Act and rejecting argument that Act was unconstitutionally vague); United
States v. McCutcheon, 446 F.2d 133, 136 (7th Cir. 1971) ("[Act] was not unconstitutional as
an invasion of police powers reserved to the state."); see also Ehrman & Henigan, supra
note 11, at 7 (stating Second Amendment erects no "real barrier" to federal laws affecting
firearms).
104 Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107 Stat. 1536 (1993).
105 Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994).
1o Id. (outlining statutory waiting period permitting chief law enforcement officer to
conduct background check).
107 See Loomis, supra note 33, at 167 (expounding waiting period which permits pur-
chaser to "cool down, if the purchase was made in the heat of passion").
10s See Cottrol & Diamond, supra note 24, at 310 (pointing out Supreme Court has been
reluctant to decide any Second Amendment controversies); see also Diemer, supra note 9, at
4A (quoting Texas Law School professor Sanford Levinson, who said that he doubted fed-
eral courts would "pick a fight" with Congress over assault weapons).
109 See Printz v. United States, 854 F. Supp. 1503, 1519-20 (D. Mont. 1994) (invalidating
one clause of Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act while upholding remainder of Act);
see also Mack v. United States, 856 F. Supp. 1372, 1383 (D. Ariz. 1994) (denying enforce-
ability of portion of Brady Act while still upholding constitutionality of entire Act); McGee
v. United States, No. 2:94-CV-67PS, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10610, at *17 (S.D. Miss. June
2, 1994) (holding section of Brady Bill unconstitutional).
110 See Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 519 (1989) (holding protec-
tion of human life and health are compelling governmental interests); Quilici v. Village of
Morton Grove, 532 F. Supp. 1169, 1184-85 (N.D. 11M. 1981) (upholding village ordinance
banning possession of handguns), aff'd, 695 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
863 (1983); see also Gun South Inc. v. Brady, 877 F.2d 858, 867 (11th Cir. 1989) "The public
interest in avoiding the importation of possible illegal assault rifles which could contribute
significantly to this country's violent crime epidemic is clearly substantial." Id.; 140 CONG.
Rec. S12,285, 12,288 (1994) (statement of Ms. Moseley-Braun commenting assault weap-
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Handgun regulation, such as the Brady Act, is one step towards
reducing the proliferation of violence in the United States of
America,"' but it is far from adequate. 1 2 Such regulation does
not include assault weapons, which are twenty times more likely
to be used in a crime than a conventional firearm, 1i and are in-
creasingly becoming the weapons of choice for drug dealers, mass
murderers, street gangs, and terrorists. 14 It is apparent that ad-
ons serve no other purpose but to kill as many humans as possible); Wagner, supra note 14,
at 1453-54 (asserting prevention of violent crimes serves as justification in banning of as-
sault weapons).
111 See Levinson, supra note 14, at 655. The author quoted former Justice Lewis Powell,
who noted that since there were over 40,000 murders committed in the United States in
1986, he could not understand why the Second Amendment "should be viewed as creating a
right to own and carry a weapon that contributes so directly to the shocking number of
murders in our society." Id. But see Kates, supra note 14, at 205 n.3 (citing NATIONAL INSTI-
TrrE OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, WEAPONS, CRIM:E AND VIOLENCE IN AMERICA
(1981)). The author noted:
It is commonly hypothesized that much criminal violence, especially homicide, occurs
simply because the means of lethal violence (firearms) are readily available at hand,
and thus, that much homicide would not occur were firearms generally less available.
There is no persuasive evidence that supports this view.
Kates, supra note 14, at 205.
112 United States v. Warin, 530 F.2d 103, 108 (6th Cir.) ("There can be no question that
an organized society which fails to regulate the importation, manufacture and transfer of
the highly sophisticated lethal weapons in existence today does so at its peril."), cert. de-
nied, 426 U.S. 948 (1976); see also Wendy Kaminer, Crime and Community; Part 1, THE
ATLANTIC, May 1994, at 111 (saying Brady Act probably will have little effect on gun
violence).
113 Wagner, supra note 14, at 1457 n.266 (quoting L. Stanley Chauvin Jr., Time to As-
sault Weapons, A.B.. J., May 1990, at 8). Assault weapons are twenty times more likely to
be used in crimes than conventional firearms. Id. Criminals prefer these weapons because
they have features such as a large ammunition capacity, rapid fire capability, and ease of
concealment. Id. at 14; see also Horwitz, supra note 10, at 133 (detailing dangers inherent
in assault weapons). "[One of [assault weapons] most obvious non-sporting applications is
in the criminal area." Id.; Udulutch, supra note 18, at 133. "[S]emi-automatic weapons...
have become the weapon of choice for drug gangs in the United States." Id. See Church,
supra note 86, at 23. "Richard Stutman, head of the Drug Enforcement Agency in New
York, stated that the rise in the use of semi-automatic weapons parallels the rise in the
number of crack-cocaine dealers and that the Drug Enforcement Agency's raids typically
result in the seizure of high quality semi-automatic weapons." Id.
114 See Udulutch, supra note 18, at 53 (stating assault weapons are weapons of choice of
street gangs); see also O'Hare & Pedreira, supra note 31, at 204-05 (thinking drug dealers
could penetrate U.S. borders for millions in illegal profits and will arm themselves accord-
ingly); Roger Y, Lowe, House OKs Assault Weapons Ban; White House Basking in a Dra-
matic Victory, COLUM. DISPATCH (Ohio), May 6, 1994, at 1A (quoting Ohio Attorney General
Lee Fisher who stated assault weapons were used by most vicious criminals in society);
News (CNN television broadcast, May 2, 1994) (quoting President Bill Clinton, who stated
assault weapons are weapons of choice for gangs and terrorists); Joseph Mianowany, The
Semiautomatic Battle: The NRA's Waterloo?, UPI, March 26, 1989, at 1 (pointing to vocal
police organizations arguing for assault weapons ban which are guns of choice for drug
dealers); Paying The Bill For Violence, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 28, 1991, at 13 (stating assault
weapons are 25 times more likely to be used in drug crimes).
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ditional regulation is necessary to stem this rising tide of gun
use. 115
IV. VIOLENT CRIME CONTROL AND LAW ENFORCEMENT ACT
OF 1994
A. The Assault Weapons Ban
In September of 1994, Congress passed the first comprehensive
anticrime legislation in six years, 116 described by President Clin-
ton as "the toughest, largest, smartest federal attack on crime in
the history of our country."" 7
The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994
(the "Anti-Crime Act")T 8 includes an assault weapons ban spon-
sored by California Senator Dianne Feinstein.119 The Feinstein
Amendment 2 ° to the Anti-Crime Act incorporates a ban of
nineteen assault weapons, 12 1 copycat models,122 and large-capac-
115 O'Hare & Pedreira, supra note 31, at 204 (noting need for federal intervention by
regulating assault weapons).
116 See Ann Devroy & Kenneth J. Cooper, $30 Billion Voted to Combat Crime-Clinton
Seeks Credit for Toughest' Bill, WASH. POST, July 29, 1994, at Al (discussing provisions for
hiring of 100,000 new police officers, banning certain assault weapons, spreading death
penalty to sixty additional crimes, and funding for additional crime prevention and pris-
ons); Daniel Klaidman, Justice Department Turf Battle Over Crime Bill's $30B; Politicians
Trying to Wrest Control of Purse Strings, Tm RECORDER, Sept. 20, 1994, at 1 (discussing
star-spangled signing ceremony of "massive crime bill").
117 Devroy & Cooper, supra note 116, at Al. President Clinton addressed voter concern
about crime by promoting the Anti-Crime Act at a Justice Department ceremony. Id.
118 Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994).
119 139 CONG. REc. S15,815 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1993). The Senate adopted the Feinstein
Amendment to the 1993 Crime Bill restricting the manufacture, transfer, and possession of
certain semiautomatic assault weapons and large capacity ammunition from feeding de-
vices by a vote of 56 to 43 on November 17, 1993. Id.; see also George Raine, Law Officials,
Victims Fete Triumphant Sen. Feinstein; Assault Weapon Ban-Her Greatest Legislative
Victory, S.F. EXAMINER, Aug. 27, 1994, at A12 (discussing Senator Feinstein's sponsor of
controversial assault weapons ban in Anti-Crime Act).
120 Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 110102 (restricting manufacture, transfer, and possession of
certain semiautomatic assault weapons); Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 110103 (banning large ca-
pacity ammunition feeding devices).
121 BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO AND FIREARMS, ASSAULT WEAPONS PROFE 1-17
(1994) [hereinafter BATF, ASSAULT WEAPONS PROFmE]. Assault weapons are large capac-
ity, semiautomatic firearms configured for rapid fire, combat use. Id. at 19. The Anti-Crime
Act prohibits the future manufacture, transfer, and possession of these nineteen assault
weapons: AK's (Norinco, Mitchell, Poly Technologies), M-10, M-11, M-1119, and M-12, Ac-
tion Arms UZI and Gall, Beretta AR-70, Colt AR-15, Fabrique Nationale (FN/FAL, FN/
LAR, and FNC), Steyr AUG, Intratec (TEC-9, TEC-DC9, and TEC-22), and Street Sweeper/
Striker 12 (including USAS 12). Id. at 1-17.
122 Memorandum from Senator Dianne Feinstein 3 (Aug. 31, 1994) [hereinafter Fein-
stein Memorandum] (on fie with authors). "Copycat models" refers to all semiautomatic
assault pistols and rifles with detachable magazine as well as semiautomatic shotguns
with two of these assault characteristics: rifles-folding/telescoping stock, protruding pistol
grip, bayonet mount, threaded muzzle or flash suppressor, and grenade launcher; pistols-
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ity gun clips, 123 while carefully exempting over 650 conventional
sporting firearms. 124 The inclusion of "copycat models" in the leg-
islation is essential for the success of this federal ban on assault
weapons to ensure that minor alterations in the manufacture of
the designated weapons will not slip through an unforeseen loop-
hole. 125 Many of the guns included in the Anti-Crime Act are al-
ready banned from importation into the United States, 126 but this
ban has had little impact since many of the weapons are being
legally manufactured in this country.' 27
The vigorous debate over the assault weapons ban has revealed
many inconsistent statistical results with regard to the use of as-
sault weapons in violent crimes.'12 A reason for these inconsisten-
magazine outside grip, threaded muzzle, barrel shroud, unloaded weight of 50 ounces or
more, semiautomatic version of automatic weapon; shotguns-folding/telescoping stock,
protruding pistol grip, detachable magazine capability, fixed magazine capacity greater
than 5 rounds. Id.
123 Gunning for the Crime Bill.... WASH. POST, Aug. 6, 1994, at A18 (noting Anti-Crime
Act included provision banning ammunition-feeding devices holding more than ten
rounds); see also Kennedy, supra note 77, at B2. Brooklyn Congressman Charles E. Schu-
mer stated the importance of outlawing clips that hold more than ten bullets: "If this gun-
man had chosen to, he could have shot 29 more people without pausing to reload."; id. at B2
(noting importation of semiautomatic assault rifle used in killing of stagehand at Rockefel-
ler Center has been illegal since May 1994, but standard ammunition clip used in shooting
is banned in Anti-Crime Act of September 1994).
124 See BATF, ASSAULT WEAPONS PROFILE, supra note 121, at 20 (noting Anti-Crime Act
does not threaten law abiding gun owners); Feinstein Memorandum, supra note 122, at 1
(expressing her conviction to protect rights of law-abiding citizens to possess weapons for
"target, sporting, or other legitimate recreational purposes").
125 See Katharine Q. Seelye, Texos Legislator Seeking to Soften Assault-Arms Ban, N.Y.
ToMms, July 22, 1994, at A18 (noting that deleting "copycat models" from Anti-Crime Act
would weaken ban on assault weapons); see also Craft, supra note 43, at A3 (discussing bill
to broaden California's assault weapons ban to include copycat models to prevent manufac-
turers from easily circumventing legislation).
126 BATF, ASSAULT WEAPONS PROFILE, supra note 121, at 1-17. The firearms that are
banned in the Anti-Crime Act were banned from being imported into the United States for
not meeting the sporting purpose criteria under the Gun Control Act. Id. at 19. Prior to the
ban, however, hundreds of thousands of these guns had already been imported and pres-
ently remain in circulation today. Id. at 19.
127 See id. at 1-17. The following firearms that were banned from importation under the
Gun Control Act were being manufactured in the United States prior to the Anti-Crime Act
of 1994: approximately 100,000 of the M-10, M-11, M-11/9, and M-12 semi-automatic as-
sault pistols; approximately 400,000 Colt AR-15s. Id. Subsequent to the ban on being im-
ported into the United States, the Stetr AUG rifles have been manufactured in limited
quantities in the United States. Id. Subsequent to the importation ban, the Street Sweeper/
Striker 12 (including the USAS 12) assault shotguns have been manufactured in the
United States. Id.
128 See id. at 19 (noting although assault weapons account for less than one percent of all
firearms in United States, they turn up in eight percent of crime guns traced by Bureau).
Compare Charles Laurence, Clinton Ban on 'Ugly Killing Machines' Angers Gun Lobby;
Critics Say the Crime Bill Strikes a Blow Against a Right Rooted in the Wild West, THE
DAny TELEGRAPH (London), Aug. 29, 1994, at 11 (noting that Handgun Control also reports
that assault rifles and semiautomatics are 20 times more likely to be used in crime than
other firearms) and Jim Wolf, Debate Rages in U.S. Over Assault Weapons, REutrEs, Apr.
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cies may be that prior to the Feinstein Amendment, there was no
accepted federal definition of an assault weapon. 129 To remedy
this problem, the Anti-Crime Act provides the first and only na-
tional statutory definition of an assault weapon. 0 Since there are
no national registration procedures for purchases of assault weap-
ons, 13 ' it is virtually impossible to ascertain an accurate count of
weapons in the United States.13 2 In addition, since classifications
of assault weapons vary,13 the incidence of violent crimes involv-
ing specific assault weapons is difficult to assess.13 1
17, 1990 (citing Atlanta Journal, discussing government study indicating that assault guns
are 20 times more likely to be used in crime than conventional firearms) with Eric C. Mor-
gan and David B. Kopel, The 'Assault Weapon" Panic, Political Correctness Takes Aim at
the Constitution, INDEPENDENCE INST., Apr. 10, 1993, at 23 (contending that assault weap-
ons are used in only one percent of gun crime).
129 See Assault Weapons as a Public Health Hazard, supra note 80, at 3068 (suggesting
lack of precise definition has been obstacle to successful federal legislation restricting as-
sault weapons).
130 See Carl Ingram, Lungren, Roberti OK Rewriting of '89 Gun Law, L.A. TIMES, Aug.
29, 1991, at A3 (noting California's legislature overcame major opposition from NRA and
enacted nation's first prohibition of high-capacity paramilitary firearms).
131 See Assault Weapons as a Public Health Hazard, supra note 80, at 3608 (noting gun
manufacturers are not required to release sales figures); HANDGUN CONTROL INC.,
H.R.4296, QUESTIONS & ANswERs 1 (1994) (noting assault weapons lawfully possessed
prior to Anti-Crime Act's effectiveness may be retained without registration).
132 Assault Weapons as a Public Health Hazard, supra note 80, at 3068 (noting reliable
estimates on number of assault weapons owned by private citizens in United States are
unavailable); see also Wolf, supra note 128 (presenting both sides of the debate over as-
sault weapons).
133 See Wolf, supra note 128 (noting lack of precise definition of assault weapon).
134 See id. (noting actual numbers of deaths and injuries caused by assault weapons are
not known since no separate category for assault weapons in FBI's Uniform Crime Reports
exists); see also Memorandum from Richard H. Girgenti, New York State Director of Crimi-
nal Justice and Commissioner, Division of Criminal Justice Services 1 (June 22, 1994)
[hereinafter Memorandum from Richard H. Girgentil (on file with authors). Legislation
proposed in New York State defines assault weapon as "any centerfire semiautomatic rifle,
shotgun or pistol capable of having loaded in its magazine and chamber more than six
cartridges for a long gun and ten cartridges for a pistol." Id. "Also included in the definition
[of assault weapons] are makes and models of semiautomatic firearms of military design
(and their copies) and semiautomatic weapons with military style characteristics such as
flash suppressors, grenade launchers, night sights, barrel jackets or multi-burst trigger
activators." Id. The definition of an "assault weapon" in the New York State legislation is
different from the definition in the Anti-Crime Act of 1994. See ASSAULT WEAPONS AND
HOMICIDE IN NEW YORK, supra note 78, at 7. Specifically, the researchers concluded that:
the assault weapons were involved in at lease 16 percent (43 cases) of the 271 homi-
cides where discharged firearms were recovered, and in 25 percent of the 169 homi-
cides where a recovered firearm was positively linked with ballistic evidence from the
crime. The majority of these assault weapons were semiautomatic pistols equipped
with large-capacity ammunition magazines.
Id.; see also Memorandum from Richard H. Girgenti, supra, at 2. "Richard H. Girgenti,
Commissioner of DCJS and Governor Cuomo's chief criminal justice advisor said that the
25 percent figure indicates that past claims regarding the use of assault weapons in homi-
cides have underestimated their involvement." Id.
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Using the weapons identified in the Anti-Crime Act, in April of
1994, an "Assault Weapons profile" released by the United States
Department of the Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Fire-
arms ("BATF") announced that the nineteen assault weapons
targeted in the Anti-Crime Act comprise only one percent of the
guns in circulation in the United States. 35 However, these weap-
ons account for up to eight percent of the guns traced to criminal
activity. 13 6 These assault weapons are preferred by criminals over
law-abiding citizens eight to one, ranking in the top ten of all guns
traced to criminal activity. 137 Consequently, Congress's wholesale
ban of these weapons has been deemed as the most appropriate
solution to criminal gun use.'13 The ban has been recognized as
such by prominent organizations, including the American Bar As-
sociation, 139 the American Medical Association, 140 and many law
enforcement groups. 14
135 See Laurence, supra note 128, at 11 (noting that with two million semiautomatic
weapons among 200 million guns in America, some critics believe that assault weapons ban
in Crime Bill will have little impact).
136 BATF, ASSAULT WEAPONS PROFILE, supra note 121, at 19; see also Kenneth J. Cooper,
Crime Bill Negotiators Agree to Ban Some Assault Weapons, WAsH. PosT, July 28, 1994, at
A14 (noting although military-style weapons like those used at Branch Davidian complex
have been used in relatively small percentage of crimes, police still complain of being out-
gunned by criminals possessing "rapid-fire weapons").
137 See BATF, ASSAULT WEAPONs PROFILE, supra note 121, at 19 (supporting need for
national assault weapons ban); Cathleen Decker, Bush Opposes Federal Ban on Assault
Rifles; Would Leave Any Restrictions Up to State, LA. TmEis, Feb. 17, 1989, at 1 (noting
police assessment that semiautomatic firearms "have become tool of choice among drug
dealers and gang members across the nation").
138 See infra notes 139-41 and accompanying text (noting approval of and need for as-
sault weapons ban).
139 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act: Hearings Before the House Subcom-
mittee on Crime and Criminal Justice, 103d Cong., 2d Sess., Feb. 22, 1994 (testimony of
Randolph N. Stone, Chairperson Criminal Justice Section, American Bar Association
pledging ABA's support of comprehensive assault weapons ban); Kuh, supra note 83, at 2
(reporting ABA support and urging congressional attention for gun control).
140 Assault Weapons as a Public Health Hazard, supra note 80, at 3067 (citing A.MA.
support for legislation restricting sale and private ownership of large-clip, automatic and
semiautomatic firearms).
141 Assault Weapons Hearings, supra note 11 (testimony of Kenneth T. Lyons, National
President, International Brotherhood of Police Officers pledging support of largest police
union in country for national ban); Bea, supra note 4, at 38 (noting law enforcement sup-
port for assault weapons control from many organizations); Clinton-Gore Endorsed By Na-
tion's Largest Police Union, U.S. NEwswmE, Oct. 9, 1992 (reporting support of over 40,000
police officers in International Brotherhood of Police Officers); HAmUN CoNROL INC.,
supra note 2, at 4 (noting every major national law enforcement organization supports na-
tionwide assault weapons ban, including International Association of Chiefs of Police, Na-
tional Sheriffs' Association, National Association of Police Organizations, and National
Fraternal Order of Police).
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B. Challenges to the Assault Weapons Ban
1. Questions of Constitutionality
Gun advocates are concerned that the recent passage of the
Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act 14 2 is the beginning of a
national movement to quash the individual rights purportedly
conferred by the Second Amendment. 143 Proponents of the federal
assault weapons ban, however, emphasize that the Anti-Crime
Act is restrictive only to weapons with substantial destructive ca-
pacity and protective of handgun and sporting weapons owner-
ship."4 Accordingly, the legislation does not criminalize law-abid-
ing gun owners, by exempting 650 weapons,145 while eliminating
access to military-style weapons which threaten the general
population. 146
142 Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107 Stat. 1536 (1993) (providing waiting period before purchase
of hand gun and national criminal background check before transfer of any firearm); THE
NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION, THE NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION INSTITUTE FOR LEGISLA-
TIVE ACTION FACT SHEET (1994) (declaring N.R.A.'s commitment "to preserving the Second
Amendment... that guarantees the freedom of law abiding individuals to purchase, pos-
sess, and use firearms for legitimate purposes" via lobbying efforts of Institute for Legisla-
tive Action (ILA)); NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION, THE CAMPAIGN To CRIMINALIZE GUN OWN-
ERSHnP, How MEDIA MISINFORMATION THREATENS YouR RIGHTS, A SPECIAL REPORT To
OWNERS ON MEDIA TRzATzmNT OF THE SEcoND AMENDMENT 2 (1992) [hereinafter THE
CAMPAIGN To CRmINALIZE GUN OwNERSMIp] (warning public to guard against "national
media movement to condemn firearms, to disparage firearm owners, to discredit the Second
Amendment, and to ultimately destroy it").
143 See Paul Houston, The NRA Fights Back; On the Defensive Over Assault Weapons, the
Gun Lobby is Using Controversial Tactics to Target its Enemies, L.A. TmES, July 30, 1989,
at 6 (discussing NRA's position and tactics in confronting growing support for assault
weapons ban in California); Laurence, supra note 128, at 11 (discussing Crime Bill and
quoting N.R.A. executive's warning that American people will "get angrier" when full impli-
cations of bill are realized); William M. Welch, NRA Vows its Revenge at the Polls, U.S.A.
TODAY, Aug. 29, 1994, at 5A (noting N.RA.'s conviction to "mobilize members and pressure
lawmakers" to send message to Congress); cf Wayne King, A Lesson in Beating Gun Con-
trol to the Draw, N.Y. TnMEs (Trenton), May 26, 1991, at D6 (noting more than 90% of
Americans supported Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act).
144 See BATF, ASSAULT WEAPONS PROFILE, supra note 121, at 20.
145 140 CONG. REC. H3063, 3091 (1994) (noting Anti-Crime Act exempts hundreds of le-
gitimate hunting and sporting weapons, safeguarding rights of hunters and sportsmen);
Sue Kirchhoff, Suspected Gun Aimed at White House Banned by Law, RETrrERs, Oct. 29,
1994 (noting that Anti-Crime Act exempts owners of 650 sporting guns and weapons).
146 Bonderman & Henigan, Paying the Bill for Violence, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 28, 1991, at 13
(emphasizing tremendous firepower and military combat features of assault weapons and
substantial economic and social toll of selling them to general public); Id. (asserting that
assault weapons satisfy necessary factors to qualify as "abnormally dangerous" exposing
community to abnormal risk); see Banning Assault Weapons: Hearings Before the House
Judiciary Crime Committee, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1994) [hereinafter Hearings Before the
House] (testimony of Jacob Locicero) (testifying magazine capacity contributes to multiple
casualties within seconds); Id. (citing state laws limiting shelf capacity of hunting shotguns
and urging that we protect human beings at least as much as we protect wild animals);
Kirchhoff, supra note 145 (reporting attack on White House grounds by gunman using as-
sault weapon shot up to 30 bullets).
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2. Federal versus State Control
Yet another constitutionally based argument, raised by the op-
ponents of gun control legislation, is grounded within the tenets of
the Tenth Amendment. 147 The Tenth Amendment has been in-
voked to strike down federal legislation that infringed upon areas
normally under state control. 148 Through the use of the Commerce
Clause,149 Congress has been able to enact sweeping legislation in
areas normally left to the states.5 0 Congress has deemed that the
interstate flow of weapons brings federal gun legislation within
the purview of the Commerce Clause. 51 Courts have agreed with
Congress's approach, upholding federal gun control legislation
in the face of Tenth Amendment challenges. 5 2 Such court ap-
proval indicates that the federal power can be invoked to over-
come state control of guns. 15' Thus, it seems that the Anti-Crime
147 U.S. CONST. amend. X "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Consti-
tution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people." Id.
148 Id. The Tenth Amendment has been used by the Supreme Court to strike down fed-
eral legislation seeking to regulate intrastate commerce. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298
U.S. 238, 250-51 (1936) (striking down Bituminous Coal Conservation Act which sought to
provide for national minimum wage and maximum hour requirements); Schechter Poultry
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 543 (1935) (invalidating federal wage and hour
requirements).
149 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (conferring Congress power to regulate commerce among sev-
eral States).
150 See Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964) (using Com-
merce Clause to uphold civil rights legislation); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 126
(1941) (reversing district court decision quashing indictment for violation of Fair Labor
Standards Act); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37-38 (1937) (upholding
National Labor Relations Act of 1935 giving NLRB power to enforce orders which sought to
end unfair labor practices).
151 See Dickerson v. United States, 460 U.S. 103, 105 (1983) (dealing with widespread
trafficking of firearms); see also Barret v. United States, 423 U.S. 212, 215 (1976) (conced-
ing that Congress has power to regulate interstate trafficking of firearms); Assault Weap-
ons Hearings, supra note 11 (testimony of Kenneth T. Lyons, National President, Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Police Officers, underscoring need for federal intervention to prevent
interstate flow of assault weapons); Suzanne Cavanagh, Crime Control: The Federal Re-
sponse; Issue Brief, in CONG. RESEARCH SERV. 1 (1994) (noting congressional and court will-
ingness to view certain crimes as threats to commerce).
152 See United States v. Edwards, 13 F.3d 291, 293 (9th Cir. 1993) (upholding Congress's
power to regulate possession of firearms pursuant to Commerce Clause), petition for cert.
filed, (Mar. 25, 1994); United States v. Dumas, 934 F.2d 1387, 1390 (6th Cir. 1990) (giving
situation where federal gun laws do not even need to be used in interstate commerce in
order to avoid being struck down under Tenth Amendment); United States v. Alers, 852 F.
Supp. 310, 316 n.9 (D.N.J. 1994) (discussing sentencing guidelines for valid conviction of
firearms in interstate commerce), aff'd, No. 94-5300, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 31674 (3d Cir.
Oct. 28, 1994).
153 139 CONG. Rc. 156, S15,384 (1993) (statement of Sen. D'Amato, noting due to
proliferation of guns in interstate commerce, Congress could use Commerce Clause to takejurisdiction over matter).
148 ST. JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 10:123
Act would withstand constitutional scrutiny under the Tenth
Amendment.15 4
3. Sporting Purpose versus Public Health and Safety
There has been much debate over the classification of the weap-
ons targeted in the Feinstein Amendment. 155 Gun lobbyists are
particularly concerned that the banned firearms are weapons
which are widely used for sport and as collectors' items. 15 6 Propo-
nents of the assault weapons ban emphasize that in view of the
inherently dangerous nature of these guns, any sporting purpose
is outweighed by concern for public welfare and safety.157 Indeed,
proponents are quick to point out that the firearms targeted in the
Anti-Crime Act are powerful military-style guns that are designed
and marketed not as sporting shooting weapons, but rather as
weapons capable of killing a large number of humans quickly and
efficiently.' 58
154 See Assault Weapons Hearings, supra note 11 (testimony of Jim Florio, former Gover-
nor of New Jersey, stating "no individual state's law, no matter how strong, can step the
deadly flow of assault weapons across state lines"). See generally O'Hare & Pedreira, supra
note 31, at 197 (positing any attempts by N.R.A. to strike down assault weapon legislation
which passes would be futile); Assault Weapons: Hearings Before the House, supra note 146
(testimony of Jacob Locicero, noting Dec. 7, 1993, Long Island massacre was committed by
gunman who purchased assault rifle and brought weapon cross-country to New York).
155 See Mitchell Arms, Inc. v. United States, 7 F.3d 212, 213 n.2 (3rd Cir.) (defining
assault rifles), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2100 (1993); Illinois Sporting Goods Ass'n v. County
of Cook, 845 F. Supp. 582, 587 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (asserting each state must decide which guns
are inherently dangerous); Coalition of New Jersey Sportsmen v. Florio, 744 F. Supp. 602,
608 (D.N.J. 1990) (rejecting classification of air pellet gun as assault weapon).
156 See NATIONAL Ruiz ASSOCIATION, TEN MYTHs ABouT GUN CONTROL 17 (1994) (claim-
ing thousands of sanctioned Highpower Tournaments and National Matches at Camp
Perry, Ohio are held for semiautomatic, military, and military-style rifles, including the M1
Garand, Springfield MIA, and the Colt Sporter); CAMPAIGN To CRnvNAL=z GUN OWNER-
SHP, supra note 142, at 3 (claiming although semiautomated rifles targeted in Anti-Crime
Act have cosmetically military appearance, these weapons are not assault weapons and
function identically to the semiautomatic rifles of century ago).
157 See 140 CONG. REc. S11,446 (1994) (statement of Sen. Boxer); Bea, supra note 4, at 5
(commenting on significant risks to society imposed by rapid succession firing capacity of
assault weapons); Udulutch, supra note 18, at 51 (emphasizing danger of substantial fire-
power of assault weapons finding its way into wrong hands); Assault Weapons as a Public
Health Hazard, supra note 80, at 3068 (supporting California Attorney General's Office
view that danger of semiautomatic assault weapons is not necessarily in frequency of use
or volume of weapons but in killing capacity of each weapon); id. at 3069 (noting multiple
and massive wounds inflicted from assault weapons result in higher mortality rate for vic-
tims of gun violence); Katharine Q. Seelye, House Approves Bill To Prohibit 19 Arms, N.Y.
TnAs, May 6, 1994, at Al (noting support for Anti-Crime Act from Republicans as well as
Democrats based on concerns over possibility of police officers being outgunned).
158 Addison v. Williams, 546 So. 2d 220, 228 (La. Ct. App.) (discussing Colt Industries'
advertising promoting use of their Colt AR-15 rifle for purposes of killing human beings),
cert. denied, 550 So. 2d 634 (La. 1989); BATF, ASSAULT WEAPONs PROFrE, supra note 121,
at 1-17 (listing weapons targeted to be banned in Anti-Crime Act, which have tremendous
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4. Law-Abiding Citizens versus Criminals
Opponents of assault weapons control are also concerned that if
these guns are the "weapons of choice" of criminals,159 a national
ban would only deprive law-abiding citizens of the ability to ade-
quately defend themselves in a culture characterized by growing
violence. 160 Moreover, opponents allege that the only individuals
who would be restricted from obtaining assault weapons by this
legislation would be innocent victims rather than criminals. 16 In
contrast, proponents contend that the right of self-defense is not
infringed upon, since the availability of guns per se is not re-
stricted by the Anti-Crime Act. 162 They emphasize that the de-
structive capacity of an assault weapon is far beyond the capacity
needed to adequately protect one's self, family, and home.' 63 Since
handguns and several hundred other firearms are not restricted
by this legislation, it is submitted that any claim of self-defense
does not hinge upon access to assault weapons.16
4
firing power and are styled after machine guns and variations of post-World War II mili-
tary guns); see also King, supra note 143, at D6 (quoting National Coalition to Ban Hand-
guns' release describing Uzi as weapon designed to quickly and efficiently kill large number
of people); O'Hare & Pedreira, supra note 31, at 202 (emphasizing public would be safer if
certain types of weapons were made available only to military); Katharine Q. Seelye, As-
sault Weapons Ban Allowed to Stay in Anti-crime Measure, N.Y. TuMEs, July 28, 1994, at
A12. But see Laurence, supra note 128, at 11 (noting assault ban critics believe guns
targeted in legislation have been selected not because they are more lethal, but simply
because they look dangerous).
159 See BATF, ASSAULT WEAPONS PROFIE, supra note 121, at 19 (noting assault weapons
are preferred by criminals over law-abiding citizens).
160 N.R.A. INsTrrTE FOR LEGISLATVE ACTION, IT CAN HAPPEN To You 7 (1994) (discuss-
ing use of firearms for personal security and personal safety measures to prevent becoming
victim of crime).
161 See Dowlut, supra note 21, at 81-82 (discussing issue of self-defense and self-preser-
vation and reasoning that neither police nor state have duty to protect individuals); cf
BATF, ASSAULT WEAPONS PROFILE, supra note 121, at 20 (predicting assault weapons ban
will have impact on crime by emphasizing the Anti-Crime Act has been drafted to protect
the rights of law abiding gun owners and protect those who own no guns at all).
162 See BATF, ASSAULT WEAPONS PROFILE, supra note 121, at 20 (noting Anti-Crime Act
specifically exempts nearly 700 conventional sporting firearms); see also Katharine Q. See-
lye, Accord Reached On Sweeping Bill To Battle Crime, N.Y. TnwEs, July 29, 1994, at Al
(noting Crime Bill contains another gun-related measure protecting rights of hunters and
prohibiting anti-hunting protests on federal lands).
163 See ASSAULT WEAPONS AND HoAncIDs iN NEW YORK, supra note 78, at 1 (1994) (noting
many individuals view assault weapons as lacking "legitimate sporting purpose and are
unnecessary for self-defense").
164 137 CONG. RPc. H7995, H8026 (1991) (statement of Rep. Lewis of Georgia, noting
assault weapons targeted in Anti-Crime Act are not for sport or self-defense); 140 CONG.
Rxc. H3063, H3083 (1994) (statement of Mrs. Maloney, emphasizing inappropriate self-
defense purpose of assault weapons).
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V. CONCLUSION
An analysis based on the origins of the Second Amendment and
the intent of the Framers reveals that the right to bear arms is a
collective right intended to ensure an independent state militia.
This is supported by the fact that the judiciary has consistently
interpreted the Second Amendment as such, rather than as a
right of individuals to bear arms. Additionally, the right has
never been accorded absolute or fundamental status in the hierar-
chy of liberties. Consequently, the right is subject to regulation.
In an attempt to address the problem of growing gun-related vio-
lence and the proliferation of assault weapons, state legislatures
initiated restrictions concerning the manufacture, sale, and pos-
session of assault weapons. State legislative attempts at regulat-
ing have been noteworthy for their acceptance by both federal and
state courts. Unfortunately, the lack of uniformity in decisions
rendered these state regulatory schemes largely ineffective when
examined within a national perspective. The federal government
has exercised its power and regulated firearms. Such regulation,
however, did not include assault weapons. Coupling the inability
of the states to properly address the growing abuse of assault
weapons with the federal government's compelling and legitimate
interest to protect the citizenry, congressional intervention was
mandated. Congress has responded with the Violent Crime Con-
trol and Law Enforcement Act of 1994. Due to the frequency with
which firearms travel in interstate commerce, an exercise of con-
gressional commerce power is justified. This should eviscerate
any Tenth Amendment concerns of inappropriate usurpation of
state sovereignty. Therefore, it is submitted that the federal ban
of assault weapons as incorporated in the Anti-Crime Act of 1994
will not infringe upon Constitutional guarantees and will be up-
held by the courts.
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